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OBSCENITY, 1971: THE REJUVENATION OF STATE
POWER AND THE RETURN TO ROTH
DWIGHT L. TEETER, JR.t
DON R. PEMBER"-
"O BSCENITY MAY NOT BE A FOUR-LETTER WORD, but
such words are frequently the response of scholars attempting to
uncover logic or meaning in this area of United States law. In short,
to interpreters of American jurisprudence - jurists, lawyers and lay-
men - obscenity is becoming a dirty word.
From 1967 through 1970 the Supreme Court of the United
States seemed to be charting a liberating and new, but fairly predict-
able, course. Obscenity convictions, especially in state prosecutions
involving adult possession or distribution of materials, were set aside
in sizable numbers by the Supreme Court. But this spring, the Court
appeared to change its course again, thwarting those optimists who
have seriously attempted to find logic or consistency in the develop-
ment of the law of obscenity.
First, the 1970 term saw the Supreme Court explicitly aban-
don its more permissive progression and return to its 1957 decision
in Roth v. United States' for guidance in defining obscene mate-
rials.' Under Roth, once materials are defined as obscene, they do
not fall within the protective sweep of the first amendment.' Second,
t Associate Professor, School of journalism and Mass Communication, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin. A.B., University of Wisconsin, 1956; M.J., 1959; Ph.D., 1966.
Chairman, Committee on Professional Freedom and Responsibility, Association for
Education in Journalism. Co-author (with Harold L. Nelson), LAW OF MASS
COMMUNICATIONS (1969).
tt Assistant Professor, School of Communications, University of Washington.B.A., Michigan State University, 1964; M.A., 1966; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin,
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The authors acknowledge the help of Mr. Jerome S. Schmidt, a third year
law student, University of Wisconsin Law School, and Mr. Wayne Brabender, agraduate student in the University of .Wisconsin School of Journalism and Mass
Communication.
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) ; United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), discussed at pp. 237 to 242 infra.
3. 354 U.S. at 484.
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the term also saw the Court return to its pre-1965 posture of de-
manding federal abstention from intervening in state obscenity pros-
ecutions.4 Since mid-decade and the famous Dombrowski case,5 an
increasing number of federal courts had intervened in state cases
at the trial stage, invalidating both statutes and administrative pro-
cedures on first and fifth amendment grounds. After the spring of
1971, however, because of Supreme Court fiat, defendants in obscen-
ity prosecutions generally will be forced to exhaust their state rem-
edies before seeking the traditionally more libertarian federal court
interpretation of obscenity standards.
These two developments would seem to spell serious trouble
for defendants in state obscenity cases. Whereas as recently as the
autumn of 1970 many libertarians were prepared to predict that soon
possession of hardcore pornography by adults or distribution to con-
senting adults of anything short of hardcore pornography would
come inside the protection of the Bill of Rights,6 today there is far
less optimism. In place of that optimism is confusion, and some
consternation.
Is the Supreme Court moving in a new direction, or is it merely
returning to some of the standards it developed in the late 1950s
and early 1960s? It is the purpose of this article to attempt to
answer these questions and others. By outlining the several develop-
mental stages in which the law has moved since 1957, and by view-
ing more recent Supreme Court decisions in that context, it is hoped
that a pattern will emerge from which conclusions may be drawn as
to the state of the law of obscenity. To those ends, it may be seen
that the development of the law of obscenity has, to date, passed
through five distinct stages. In the initial stage, the Court was
primarily concerned with developing a workable definition of ob-
scenity, culminating in the Roth7 and "Fanny Hill"' decisions; there-
after, the focus changed from defining obscenity to controlling conduct
which, because of its categorization as "pandering," removed from
the protective ambit of the first amendment that material Which
would presumably be held to be non-obscene if standing by itself. The
third stage in the development of the law of obscenity produced a
dichotomy in the treatment of obscene material; by using the con-
cepts of "overbreadth" and "private possession," the Court appeared
4. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200(1971) ; Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971), discussed at pp. 229 to 236 infra.
5. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing,
68 MICH. L. Rv. 185 (1969).
7. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
8. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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to be carving out an area of obscenity which, although perhaps un-
protected, was nevertheless not susceptible to state regulation or
proscription. More recently the Court has begun to retrace its steps
by reapplying the abstention doctrine and, finally, by abandoning the
concept of a "Brand X" type of obscenity, which was not controllable
by the states, in favor of a more strict application of the Roth doc-
trine. This article will be divided into sections which follow that
development.
I. BACKGROUND: "DEFINING" OBSCENITY, FROM Roth To
"FANNY HILL"
The origin of the modern law of obscenity in the United States,
as attorney Stanley Fleishman has noted,9 may be traced to a thought-
ful concurring opinion in 1956 by the late Judge Jerome Frank of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In that case, affirming
the conviction of Samuel Roth under the basic federal obscenity
statute, 10 Judge Frank declared:
The troublesome aspect of the federal obscenity statute . . is
that (a) no one can now show that with any reasonable prob-
ability obscene publications tend to have any effects on the
behavior of normal, average adults, and (b) that under that
[federal] statute . . . punishment is apparently inflicted for
provoking in such adults, undesirable sexual thoughts, feelings,
or desires - not overt[ly] dangerous or anti-social conduct,
either actual or probable."
Although Judge Frank denounced the "exquisite vagueness" of ob-
scenity statutes, Roth's conviction stood, and his attorney's conten-
9. Fleishman, Witchcraft and Obscenity: Twin Superstitions, WILSON LIBRARY
BULL., April 1965, at 4.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). This section makes it a crime to mail "obscene or
crime-inciting matter," including the following:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device or substance; and
Every article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for providing abortion,
or for any indecent or immoral use; and
Every article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing which is
advertised or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use or apply it
for producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral purpose; and
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertise-
ment, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or
how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles,
or things may be obtained or made, or where or by whom any act or operation
of any kind for the procuring or producing of abortion will be done or performed,
or how or by what means abortion may be produced, whether sealed or unsealed:
and
Every paper, writing, advertisement, or representation that any article,
instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing may, or can, be used or applied
for producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral purpose; and
Every description calculated to induce or incite a person to so use or apply
any such article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing.
11. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
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tions that such statutes were unconstitutionally vague restraints on
speech and press were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court of the
United States then granted certiorari. 2
As the Supreme Court of the United States upheld Roth's con-
viction, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in his majority opinion, laid
down the test for defining obscenity as "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.'
'3
Elsewhere in his Roth opinion, Justice Brennan wrote words which
were then merely dicta, but which were to have great significance in
subsequent cases:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social im-
portance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full pro-
tection of the guaranties [of free speech and press] . . ..
Some ideas, however, were not included under constitutional
protection: Justice Brennan wrote that "implicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly with-
out redeeming social importance."' 5  In point of historical fact, it
does not seem that the Founding Fathers were much concerned about
obscenity and pornography. Then, as one historian has observed,
"babes, ladies, and even the most saintly of the clergy, in jest and
in ordinary conversation, used language which today would startle
an aviation mechanic."'" Furthermore, it might be noted that the
men who made the American Revolution could not have been too
concerned about sexually explicit literature; the Continental Con-
gress in 1776 appointed the author of the salty Speech of Polly Baker
as the new nation's first postmaster general. His name? Benjamin
Franklin.' 7
The legal significance of Roth rested not so much in its defini-
tion of obscenity as in its rejection of the notion that obscenity was
protected by the first amendment. At the same time, however, the
12. 352 U.S. 964 (1957). The Court, in Alberts v. California, 352 U.S. 962
(1957), also noted probable jurisdiction over an obscenity case brought under a
California statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1952). The Roth and Alberts
cases were decided simultaneously by the Court.
13. 354 U.S. at 489.
14. Id. at 484. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which
adopted the idea that to be actionable, obscene material must be "utterly without
redeeming social value." 383 U.S. at 418.
15. 354 U.S. at 484.
16. C. SHIPTON, ISAIAH THOMAS, PRINTER, PATRIOT AND PHILANTHROPIST 2
(1948).
17. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 802, 806 (1957) (Frank, J., concurring),
citing C. VAN DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 150-51, 153-54 (1938).
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Court liberalized earlier standards for defining obscenity' and started
down the path to becoming what Justice Robert Jackson had called
in 1948 the "High Court of Obscenity."'"
Two minority opinions in Roth deserve special attention because
they accurately forecast developments to come after 1957 in the law
of obscenity: Chief Justice Earl Warren's concurring opinion, and
Justice John Marshall Harlan's concurring-dissenting opinion. Chief
Justice Warren agreed with the majority that both Samuel Roth
and David Alberts should be punished for dealing in salacious ma-
terials. He stated, however, that the issue in this and other obscenity
cases was not the character of a book, but was, instead, the conduct
of the defendant. The Chief Justice wrote:
The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an attribute
of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus placed
in context from which they draw their color and character. A
wholly different result might be reached in a different setting.20
Because the Chief Justice believed that both Roth and Alberts had
participated in "the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shame-
ful craving for materials with prurient effect,"'" he added that the
federal and state governments could constitutionally punish such
conduct. In 1967, ten years after Chief Justice Warren wrote that
concurring opinion, the Supreme Court began to embrace a view-
point on punishing conduct which was close to Mr. Justice Warren's
1957 statement.22
While Justice Harlan's minority opinion went off in several di-
rections, the benefit of hindsight permits the conclusion that the
Justice's most significant observations were directed toward the gov-
ernmental level at which obscene matter should be controlled, rather
than a definition of such matter. Justice Harlan asserted that the
states, not the federal government, should have the principal job of
controlling sexually explicit materials.28
Subsequent cases between 1957 and 1966 attempted to refine
the definition of obscenity as advanced in Justice Brennan's majority
18. This earlier standard was embodied in the famed old "Hicklin Rule," as
stated by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn: "whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those, whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort might fall." L.R. 3 Q.B.
360, 370 (1868), adopted by U.S. Courts in United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas.
1093, 1103-04 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); see also Commonwealth v. Friede,
271 Mass. 318, 320, 171 N.E. 472, 473 (1930).
19. See Lewis, Sex and the Supreme Court, EsQuIRE, June 1963, at 82.
20. 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
21. Id. at 496.
22. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969), discussed at pp. 219 to 224 infra.
23. 354 U.S. at 505-06 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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opinion in Roth. In 1962, for example, in Manual Enterprises v.
Day,24 Justice Harlan wrote that magazines designed for a homo-
sexual audience were "dismally unpleasant, uncouth and tawdry,"
but not obscene and unmailable. Here, Justice Harlan added another
term, "patent offensiveness," to the lexicon of obscenity law. He
wrote:
These magazines cannot be deemed so offensive on their face as
to affront current community standards of decency - a quality
that we shall hereafter refer to as "patent offensiveness" or "in-
decency." Lacking that quality, the magazine cannot be deemed
legally "obscene . . 5
Another phrase in the Roth definition of obscenity - "com-
munity standards" - got a working over by the Court in the 1964
case of Jacobellis v. Ohio.26 The phrase was given a "'national con-
temporary community standards" emphasis by Justice Brennan in
writing that a film, Les Amants, was not obscene. Justice Brennan
rejected contentions that the "contemporary community standards"
phrase in the Roth test implied "a determination of the constitutional
question of obscenity in each case by the standards of the particular
local community from which the case arises. ' 27 His argument, how-
ever, did not convince a majority of the Court, because only one
other justice, Arthur Goldberg, agreed that there should be a "national
standard." Three other justices who joined in holding the film not
obscene did so on other grounds."8 Some of the implications of the
continuing absence of a national standard will be discussed at greater
length in Part IV of this article. 9
Fanny Hill, the piece de non-resistance in John Cleland's Mem-
oirs of a Woman of Pleasure, is indeed a hardy old tart. Cleland's
book, written in England in 1749, was, in 1821, the first book to be
the subject of an obscenity prosecution in America."0 Some 145 years
24. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
25. Id. at 482.
26. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
27. Id. at 191.
28. Id. at 196. Justices Black and Douglas, joining in a concurring opinion,
maintained that the conviction of the appellant would be an unconstitutional abridge-
ment of freedom of the press. Justice Stewart concurred on the basis that the
Constitution protects all but hard-core pornography, which he admittedly could not
define. ["But I know it when I see it." Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).]
29. The Supreme Court, via the case of Miller v. California, unreported, cert.
granted, 401 U.S. 992 (1971) (No. 1288), is expected to decide this term whether
a national or local standard is to be used in defining obscenity.
30. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). An even earlier American
obscenity 'case involved "a lewd, scandalous, and obscene painting." Commonwealth
v. Sharpless, 2 S & R 91 (Pa. 1815).
[VOL. 17: p. 211
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later, the Supreme Court of the United States, despite the erotic
novel's enthusiastic description of more than 30 sex acts,"' held that
the Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure was not obscene because "[a]
book can not be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without
redeeming social value." 32 Justice Brennan then summed up the
Court's 1966 view of tests for obscenity:
We defined obscenity in Roth in the following terms:
"[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest" . . . . Under this defini-
tion, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must
coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.3
From Roth in 1957 through the 1966 decision in the "Fanny Hill"
case, the Supreme Court's preoccupation was with content, and with
the problem of classifying or defining - and then prohibiting -
obscenity.
II. CONTROLLING CONDUCT, FROM Ginzburg To Stanley, 1966-1969
After delivering the Court's decisions in the "Fanny Hill' and
Mishkin 4 cases on March 21, 1966, Mr. Justice Brennan then
turned - with evident revulsion - to the case of Ginzburg v.
United States. 5 Ginzburg represented a new departure for the Court
in obscenity cases: the content of the materials involved was treated
as being of little consequence; instead, Justice Brennan made the
conduct of the defendant pivotal to upholding Ginzburg's conviction.
Justice Brennan wrote:
[T]he question of obscenity may include consideration of the
setting in which the publications were presented as an aid to
determining the question of obscenity, and [we] assume with-
out deciding that the prosecution could not have succeeded other-
wise. 6
31. See, e.g., the shocked dissent by Justice Clark, Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 445 (1966).
32. Id. at 419 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
33. Id. at 418.
34. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). The Court in that case
declared that the prurient appeal of the material was to be judged with reference
to the "target group" for whom the material is intended.
35. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
36. Id. at 465-66.
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It is perhaps understandable that a number of the Court's members
might take notice of Ginzburg's conduct. Ginzburg, evidently be-
lieving that the Roth test made it safe for him to peddle his wares,
boasted of the sexual content of three publications: Eros, an expen-
sive hard cover magazine •resembling an American Heritage for
the oversexed; Liaison, a bi-weekly newsletter devoted to keeping sex
an art and preventing it from becoming a science; and a "short book"
titled The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity. One
of Ginzburg's advertisements claimed:
EROS handles the subjects of Love and Sex with complete
candor. The publication of this magazine - which is frankly
and avowedly concerned with erotica - has been enabled by
recent court decisions ruling that a literary piece or painting,
though explicitly sexual in content, has a right to be published
if it is a genuine work of art.
EROS is a genuine work of art."7
Justice Brennan made explicit reference to "abundant evidence"
from Ginzburg's trial in federal district court "that each of the ac-
cused publications was originated or sold as stock in trade of the
sordid business of pandering - 'the business of purveying textual
or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest
of their customers.' "" It was also noted, as evidence of "pander-
ing," that Ginzburg had sought - and been denied - mailing privi-
leges in the colorfully named towns of Intercourse and Blue Ball,
Pennsylvania. Ginzburg finally succeeded in getting mailing privi-
leges in Middlesex, New Jersey.8"
Brennan's majority opinion drew infuriated dissents from four
members of the Court, Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart.
Justice Black declared:
Only one stark fact emerges with clarity out of the con-
fusing welter of opinions and thousands of words written in
this and two other cases today. That fact is that Ginzburg, peti-
tioner here, is now finally and authoritatively condemned to
serve five years in prison for distributing printed matter about
sex which neither Ginzburg nor anyone else could possibly have
known to be criminal.40
Justice Potter Stewart was equally emphatic, writing that Ginzburg
"was not charged with 'commercial exploitation'; he was not charged
37. Id. at 469 n.8.
38. Id. at 467.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 17: p. 211
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with 'pandering'; he was not charged with 'titillation.' "41 A con-
viction on such grounds, Justice Stewart argued, was a denial of
due process.42 Similarly, Justice Harlan asserted that the Court's
majority had in effect rewritten the federal obscenity statute in order
to convict Ginzburg, and added that he considered the newly created
"pandering" concept to be unconstitutionally vague. Justice Douglas
added his own outraged dissent, arguing that:
The advertisements of our best magazines are chock-full of
thighs, ankles, calves, bosoms, eyes, and hair, to draw the poten-
tial buyers' attention to lotions, tires, food, liquor, clothing,
autos and even insurance policies. . . And I do not see how
it adds to or detracts . . .. from the legality of the book being
distributed. A book should stand on its own, irrespective of the
reasons why it was written or the wiles used in selling it. I
cannot imagine any promotional effort that would make chap-
ters 7 and 8 of the Song of Solomon any the less or any more
worthy of First Amendment protection than does their un-
ostentatious inclusion in the average edition of the Bible.4
Despite such angry words, it appears in retrospect that the
Ginzburg decision may have been a mixed curse.45 The switch from
looking at content to looking at a defendant's conduct was highly
important. Early in 1967, in the wake of more highly publicized
cases such as Ginzburg, the Supreme Court issued a cryptic but im-
portant per curiam decision known as Redrup v. New York."6 Redrup
made little splash when first decided, but it became, for a time, a
precedent of major importance in overturning, obscenity convictions.
41. Id. at 500 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 494 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The concept of pandering may be clarified somewhat this term in the case of
Rabe v. Washington, in which the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari.
Rabe v. Washington, 79 Wash. 2d 254, 484 P.2d 917, cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3190 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1971) (No. 71-247). In that case, petitioner Rabe was convicted
under a Washington obscenity statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.68.010 (1961), pro-
scribing the knowing exhibition of obscene matter. Petitioner owned a drive-in
motion picture theater where he was showing the film Carmen Baby. The picture
screen faced several neighboring houses and a public highway. Although it was
admitted by the Supreme Court of Washington that only portions of the picture
were obscene, 79 Wash. 2d at 256, 484 P.2d at 919, the court held, citing Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), that "movies which are obscene only in part
may be constitutionally suppressed under state obscenity laws when the movie is
commercially exhibited in such a way that it intrudes upon the privacy of non-
consenting citizens who cannot as a practical matter avoid being exposed to the film."
79 Wash. 2d at 258, 484 P.2d at 921. Thus, although the Washington statute made
no reference to pandering sales, Mr. Rabe's conviction was upheld on that basis alone.
44. Id. at 482-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. Although libertarians have raised many objections to the manner in which
Ginzburg was convicted, five years afterwards he had still not paid his fine or served
a day in jail. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1971, at 44, col. 8.
46. 383 U.S. 767 (1967). See Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from Obscenity,
Redrup v. New York, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 175 (1969).
DECEMBER 1971.] 219
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In less than two years after it was announced, Redrup was cited as
controlling or as an important force in reversing a total of 35 ob-
scenity convictions. 47 A more recent accounting by 0. John Rogge
has emphasized Redrup's importance: "Redrup became the password,
as it were, for the reversal of obscenity convictions. 48
Redrup has been an important precedent, although the Supreme
Court did not apply it with any sort of consistent exactitude. In less
than three pages, Redrup's anonymous majority opinion said that
because a majority of the Court could not agree on a test for judging
obscenity, three lower court convictions were to be reversed:"
Two members of the Court [Black and Douglas] have con-
sistently adhered to the view that a State is utterly without
power to suppress, control or punish the distribution of any
writings or pictures upon the ground of their "obscenity." A
third [Stewart] has held to the opinion that a State's power in
this area is narrowly limited to a distinct and identifiable class
of material. Others [Warren, Fortas, and Brennan] have sub-
scribed to a not dissimilar standard, holding that a State may
not constitutionally inhibit the distribution of literary material
as obscene unless "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the mate-
rial is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters, and (c) the material is utterly without re-
deeming social value." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 418-419. Another Justice [White] has not viewed the
"social value element as an independent factor in the judgment
of obscenity. Id., at 460-462 (dissenting opinion).
Whichever of these constitutional views is brought to bear
upon the cases before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot stand.
Accordingly, the judgment in each case is reversed.5°
The Court indicated in Redrup that there could be four reasons
for upholding a conviction for obscenity:
(1) Where the publication is "hardcore pornography" or with-
out redeeming social value, perhaps as defined by former Solicitor
General - now Supreme Court Justice - Thurgood Marshall.
Marshall's definition spoke of
[s]uch materials . . . [as] photographs, both still and motion
picture, with no pretense of artistic value, graphically depicting
47. Teeter & Pember, supra note 46, at 176.
48. Rogge, Williams v. Florida: End of a Theory, 16 VILL. L. REv. 607, 614(1971).
49. 386 U.S. at 770-71.
50. Id.
220 [VOL. 17: p. 211
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acts of sexual intercourse, including various acts of sodomy
and sadism, and sometimes involving several participants in
scenes of orgy-like character. They also include strips of draw-
ings in comic-book format grossly depicting similar activities
in an exaggerated fashion. There are, in addition, pamphlets
and booklets, sometimes with photographic illustrations, ver-
bally describing such activities in a bizzare manner with no
attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situa-
tion and with no pretense to literary value.5 '
(2) Where there is evidence of "pandering sales" - even of
matter not deemed hardcore - as in Ginzburg v. United States;
52
(3) Where there is a statute reflecting a "specific and limited
state concern for juveniles ;"" and
(4) Where there is "an assault upon individual privacy by
publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
the unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it."' 4
Redrup was perceived by some judges as a whittling away, to
some extent, of the 1957 declaration in Roth that if something were
to be defined as obscene, it could have no constitutional protection.
For example, Ohio Judge Gilbert Bettman wrote in December of
1967" that Justice Marshall's definition of hard-core pornography,
as promulgated by Justice Stewart," had been adopted by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Bettman contended that Redrup
meant that "any ordinary book or magazine seller . . . is constitu-
tionally protected against prosecution for material, other than hard-
core pornography. . . ."" Similarly, a court of appeals in the State of
Washington ruled: "[a]s we read Redrup, offensive, worthless, pru-
rient material is not to be civilly suppressed or to be the essential
element of a criminal conviction unless the material is clearly 'hard-
core' pornography or unless the accused possessor has conducted
himself in a clearly proscribed manner."58
On the other hand, it is conceivable that Redrup was merely
another step in the process of defining obscenity which was started -
in recent times at least - in Roth. In other words, perhaps what
51. Quoted in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 n.3 (1966)(Stewart, J.).
52. See p. 218 supra.
53. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
54. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967), citing Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1959), and Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
55. State v. J. L. Marshall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 232 N.E.2d 435
(C.P. 1967).
56. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
57. 13 Ohio Misc. at 62, 232 N.E.2d at 436.
58. State v. Cox, 3 Wash. App. 700, 708, 477 P.2d 198, 203 (1970), citing
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563 (1969).
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Justice Brennan was attempting to describe in his 1957 definition
of obscenity was hard-core pornography, and in fact, while concern
with the conduct of defendant was certainly a new element in the
law, the other aspects of the short Redrup opinion were merely a
new expression of an idea started in Roth. But the basic problem in
Redrup, which will be discussed later, was that for the first time the
Supreme Court identified two different kinds of obscenity.
Two years after Redrup, in Stanley v. Georgia,59 the Supreme
Court took Redrup's implications and seemed to go even further in
the direction of providing some constitutional protection for sexually
explicit literature. We now turn to a brief discussion of Stanley v.
Georgia.
Stanley v. Georgia
In 1966, a Georgia state investigator and three federal agents,
operating with a federal search warrant, entered the home of Robert
E. Stanley. The warrant stated that the officers were looking for
bookmaking records and money used in a wagering business. While
poking through a desk drawer in Stanley's upstairs bedroom, the
searchers found not bookmaking evidence but three reels of eight
millimeter film. Using a projector and screen handily found in a
nearby room, the officers treated themselves to a free movie. The
investigators asserted that the films were obscene and Stanley was
subsequently charged with possession of obscene matter in violation
of Georgia law.
Georgia's courts ruled that the films were obscene and that the
seizure of the three reels was "incident to a lawful search." Georgia's
supreme court added that to convict Stanley of possessing obscene
materials, it was not necessary to show that he planned to sell, dis-
tribute, or circulate them. ° Later, when Georgia contested Stanley's
appeal from his conviction, the state argued that under Roth v.
United States, "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press."'" Therefore, it was argued, Georgia could
deal with obscenity as it saw fit, controlling it just as it restricts
other materials harmful to the welfare of its citizens.
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously and em-
phatically rejected Georgia's arguments, even though for the pur-
poses of the case the Court assumed that the films were obscene.
In writing the Court's opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall con-
59. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
60. Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 260-62, 161 S.E.2d 309, 310-12 (1968).
61. 354 U.S. at 485.
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ceivably could have decided the case on the basis of an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure.6 2 Instead, however, Justice Marshall chose
to base his decision on the concepts of freedom of expression and
the right of privacy. Justice Marshall crippled Georgia's argument
that Roth had declared obscenity outside the bounds of protected
speech by distinguishing the Stanley case from Roth. "None of the
statements cited by the Court in Roth," he wrote, ". . . were made
in the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of ob-
scene material. ,"" The cases cited, he continued, concerned
the public distribution of obscene matter. A state certainly has the
ability to deal with the problems of obscenity, the Justice wrote, but
there are some circumstances in which "mere categorization" of
material as obscene is insufficient to permit state action. Obscenity
cannot, he said, in every instance "be insulated from all constitu-
tional protections. 64 The constitution protects the "right to receive
information and ideas."65
Whatever may be the justification for other statutes regulating
obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's
own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his
own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch.66
The Marshall opinion in Stanley has caused a good deal of per-
plexity not so much because of what the Associate Justice said, but
because of things he did not say. At first glance, the decision ap-
pears to be merely a negative extension of the Redrup reasoning.
And it certainly is that. Redrup asserted that prosecution could suc-
ceed if distribution was conducted in such a manner as to constitute
an assault upon the privacy of an unwilling recipient. Stanley as-
serted that because the defendant was not bothering anyone else he
could not be prosecuted.
That, however, may well be an oversimplified explanation of
the opinion. In addition, Justice Marshall said that in some cases
obscenity should receive constitutional protection. 67 This appears to
be the first time the Supreme Court has ever said that sometimes
obscenity may be deserving of shielding from the Constitution. But
is it? The problem lies not completely with Marshall. Equally to
62. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
63. 394 U.S. at 560-61.
64. Id. at 563.
65. Id. at 564.
66. Id. at 565.
67. Id. at 564-65.
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blame is the unknown author of the per curian majority opinion
in Redrup - the Justice who for the first time in the history of the
Court began talking about two different kinds of obscenity. On the
one hand he wrote of "hard-core pornography" - the kind of ob-
scenity without redeeming social value. This can be suppressed with-
out constitutional objection. On the other hand he discussed another
kind of obscenity - "Brand X," if you will - which can only be
presumed to be "non-hard-core pornography." Such non-hard-core
pornography can also be suppressed, if it is marketed improperly.
Obviously, the mystery author of the opinion was not suggesting
that every other kind of material, from Grimm's Fairy Tales to a book
of recipes, could be constitutionally suppressed if sold to juveniles, or
if there was evidence of pandering sale or distribution which invaded
privacy. But this second class of "Brand X" pornography was never
described or even labeled. It just somehow popped into existence in
the Redrup majority opinion.
It is this lack of precision, resulting from the virtually unspoken
belief that there is this "Brand X" obscenity, which has created
problems in understanding the Stanley opinion. When Justice Mar-
shall asserted that in some situations obscenity will be protected by
the first amendment, what kind was he talking about: hard-core or
"Brand X ?" If he included hard-core pornography - material utterly
without redeeming social value - then Stanley is clearly the ultra-
libertarian high-water mark in obscenity law. But if Marshall was
referring to the other kind of obscenity, to "Brand X" obscenity,
then Stanley is merely an extension - albeit a confusing one - of
Redrup.
Justice Marshall never made it clear in his opinion in Stanley
as to which kind of obscenity he was referring. This ambiguity has
created great confusion, especially in the lower courts, about what
Stanley really means. Finally, one might unearth the "hard cases
make bad law" truism once again. Stanley, in retrospect, seems to
have been more of a privacy case than an obscenity case. Perhaps in
eagerness to state a right to be secure against search and seizure -
even if one does possess films which are utterly without redeeming
social value - Mr. Marshall's opinion said at once too much and
too little.
III. Two FLEETING PROMISES FROM Redrup AND Stanley, 1968-
1970: "OvERBREADTH" AND "PRIVATE POSSESSION"
The authors have elsewhere noted that in Redrup, the Court
seemed to be grasping for a "standard of conduct," and that it might
[VOL. 17: p. 211
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/1
DECEMBER 1971]
indeed be easier to judge conduct than to divine whether or not a
particular piece of material is obscene. 8 We perceived Justice Stew-
art's use of a strict definition of hard-core pornography - that
which has no redeeming social value - as amounting to protection
for a good many sexually preoccupied materials. We argued that
"the stringent definition of 'hard--core pornography' advanced by
Justice Stewart could be little protection for a distribution of mate-
rial that was seen by a court to be an invasion of privacy, a sale to
a minor, or a 'pandering' sale.""
Similarly, Stanley has been viewed as an important precedent
because the Supreme Court for the first time granted at least limited
constitutional protection to the possession of admittedly obscene ma-
terial (of one kind or another), so long as the material was pos-
sessed and used in private. In Stanley, as we have seen, the fact sit-
uation was limited to Mr. Stanley's home and bedroom, although
some of Justice Marshall's language overturning the conviction ranged
beyond Stanley's abode.
Two of the more interesting concepts for which Redrup and
Stanley were invoked in overturning obscenity convictions may be
conveniently labeled "overbreadth" and "private possession." Brief
discussion of these two concepts, intended to be suggestive rather
than exhaustive, follows.
A. "Overbreadth"
Consider an obscenity case arising from assertion of federal
power to regulate imports.7" This case, rather jadedly named United
States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise," arose when several
items addressed to Fred Cherry were seized by United States Cus-
toms inspectors upon entry at the port of New York. Circuit Judge
Leonard Moore, speaking for a three-judge federal court, declared
19 U.S.C. section 1305 to be unconstitutionally overbroad because
it forbade the importation of obscene materials regardless of their
intended use.72 He declared that two uses of obscenity were consti-
tutionally protected: private use and "non-commercial exchange with
'like-minded adults.'-"3
68. Teeter & Pember, supra note 46.
69. Id. at 187.
70. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970), the importation of "immoral articles,"
including books, papers, pictures, drawings or the like which are "obscene and
immoral," as well as "any drug or medicine or any article whatever for the prevention
of conception" is prohibited.
71. 315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
72. Id. at 196.
73. Id.
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Similarly, United States District Judge James E. Doyle of
Madison, Wisconsin held a statute forbidding interstate transporta-
tion of obscene materials to be impermissibly overbroad. 4 Judge
Doyle found 18 U.S.C. section 1462 to be overbroad because it did
not distinguish between transportation which presents danger to
minors or the danger of intruding upon the privacy of adults from
transportation which does not bring about such dangers 5 Judge
Doyle here grounded his decision upon Stanley's statement that there
is a right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth. 6 Judge Doyle declared that government "cannot indirectly
prevent an individual from receiving obscene matter for permissible
uses by making it a crime to disseminate or transport the materials
to him."'77
In other cases where similar reasoning could have been used
to free defendants in obscenity cases or to free materials from the
clutches of government, however, the "overbreadth" argument has
failed to stop prosecutions. A prime example of this failure is Gable
v. Jenkins." Gable, a book and magazine distributor, relied on
Stanley in contending that a Georgia statute79 prohibiting distribu-
tion of obscene material "to any person" was unconstitutonally over-
broad. In Gable, the three-judge district court quoted Justice Bren-
nan's statement in Stanley that state power to control obscenity does
not extend to controlling mere private possession at home. The court
added that Brennan's quote from Stanley indicated a desire on the
part of the Supreme Court to limit Stanley to its facts - private
possession in the home of three reels of eight millimeter film.8 0
Therefore, the three-judge court declared that decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States allowing the regulation of ob-
scenity "would appear to demand a holding that [the Georgia ob-
scenity statute] is constitutional.""' The decision in Gable was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in a miniscule per curiam
decision dated April 20, 1970.82 Justices Black and White dissented,
74. United States v. B & H Distrib. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis.
1970).
75. Id. at 1236.
76. Id. at 1235, quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
77. Id. at 1235.
78. 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 592 (1970).
79. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101(a) (1970).
80. 309 F. Supp. at 1000.
81. Id. at 1001.
82. 397 U.S. 592 (1970). For another case where the "overbreadth" argument
did not succeed in stopping obscenity prosecutions, see, e.g., United States v. Ten
Erotic Paintings, 311 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1970). In that case, the court held
that "most assuredly, Stanley in no way dealt with congressional power to regulate
importations into this country of obscene material." Id. at 886. See also United
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and Justice Douglas, who might have been expected to dissent, took
no part in the case.
While the overbreadth argument had limited legal success, dis
cussion of it demonstrates the impact which the Redrup and Stanley
decisions had on the lower courts - an impact which resulted at
least partly from the lack of precision in the opinions of the Supreme
Court.8" Three later Supreme Court cases, 4 to be discussed in Sec-
tion IV of this article, have effectively crushed the "overbreadth"
argument.
B. "Private Possession"
Stanley, as we have seen, at the very least applied to "mere
private possession" of sexually related materials in one's own home.
Some judges, however, evidently were hopeful that in Stanley's logic
they could find a rationale for adding the right to receive ideas as
well as the right to have books or films at home. Some of the judges
were of the impression, after reading Stanley and Redrup, that many
situations which in the past would have been legally proscribed would
now be permitted. For example, Stanley asserted that private pos-
session at home is not punishable. It seemed logical, therefore, that
if there was no intent to sell such matter, mere private possession
outside the home, in an office or car would be legal as well.85 In the
alternative, using standards set down in Redrup, would it not be
possible to legalize the sale of erotic books and pictures from a store
where minors are not permitted and where the existence of "adults-
only" material is plainly announced?" Finally, consider the theater
exhibition of an X-rated film such as I Am Curious (Yellow). This
activity would also seem to be permissible, since the advertising has
been scrupulously free from pandering influences, minors are not per-
mitted to enter the theater, and ample warning of the content of the
film is made clear to adult patrons.8
These three situations all seemed quite plausible under some
readings given to Redrup and Stanley. Some libertarians, in fact,
might have begun to sense the dawning of a new, more mature era.
States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Pattern of Evil," 304 F. Supp. 197(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
83. See pp. .225 to 226 supra.
84. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200(1971) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971).85. See, e.g., Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), vacated
and remanded sub. nom. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) ("private possession"
in an office).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 315 F. Supp.
191, 195-96 (S.DN.Y. 1970).
87. Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363, 1365-66 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and
remanded, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
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Some of the readings of Stanley"8 indeed have a number of points
of similarity to recommendations advanced in the Report of the Com-
mission on Obscenity and Pornography.9 Consider the Commis-
sion's advice:
The Commission recommends that federal, state, and local
legislation prohibiting the sale, exhibition or distribution of
sexual materials to consenting adults should be repealed.9 '
The Report added that "[t]he Commission believes that there is no
warrant for continued governmental interference with the full free-
dom of adults to read, obtain or view whatever such material they
wish."'" This latter finding was reached on the basis that the study
group was unable to find evidence that "obscene" matter had harm-
ful psychological effects on adults.
Freedom for adults, in the Commission's view, should not mean
similar liberty for juveniles:
The Commission recommends the adoption by the States
of legislation ...prohibiting the commercial distribution or dis-
play for sale of certain sexual materials to young persons. Simi-
lar legislation might also be adopted, where appropriate, by
local governments and by the federal government for applica-
tion in areas, such as the District of Columbia, where it has
primary jurisdiction over distributional conduct.92
The Commission also urged the adoption of state and local legisla-
tion to prohibit public displays of sexually explicit materials, and
expressed approval, in principle, of the 1970 Postal Reorganization
Act.98
88. E.g., United States v. Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 315 F. Supp. 191(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated
and remanded, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) ; Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D.
Tex. 1969), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
89. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970).
90. Id. at 51. Twelve of the Commission's seventeen members subscribed to
this view.
91. Id. at 52.
92. Id. at 36. Fourteen Commission members joined in this recommendation.
The specific legislation recommended by the Commission is set forth in the "Drafts
of Proposed Statutes" in Section III of the Commission's Report. Id. at 76-78.
93. Id. The Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1735 to 1737 (1970),
authorizes the Post Office to compile and maintain current lists of persons who have
declared that they do not wish to receive certain defined materials, and makes such
lists available at cost to mailers of unsolicited advertisements. Mailers would be
prohibited from sending the sexually explicit material as defined through the mails
to persons appearing on the Post Office Department's lists. REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 81 (1970). The Federal Anti-
Pandering Act, 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1970), allows a mail recipient to protect himself
from unwanted solicitations, but only after he has received at least one such
advertisement. Also, his complaint to postal inspectors under the 1968 Act would
protect him only against mail coming from one particular source.
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The Report, and a majority of the Commission, was denounced
roundly by conservative clergymen and by politicians up to and in-
cluding President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew. 4 Despite such
utterances of horror at the works of the Commission (which had
been appointed by President Johnson under Congressional mandate),
it may be seen that a number of lower courts, using passages from
Redrup and Stanley, moved toward bringing about some of the Com-
mission's majority's recommendations. It cannot be said, of course,
that the Commission was a causal factor; some of the cases cited
above had already been decided by the time the Commission's Report
was made available early in 1970. Those lower courts, tying doctrines
such as "overbreadth" and "private possession" to language within
Redrup and Stanley, made such occurrences as "adults only" circu-
lation of salacious literature or viewing of sex-laden films - with
or without "redeeming social importance" - seem quite likely. But
such was not to remain the case as the Supreme Court demonstrated
in a series of short but remarkable decisions this past spring.
IV. BACK To THE STATES: Perez v. Ledesma, Dyson v. Stein,
AND Byrne v. Karalexis
A. Perez v. Ledesma95
August M. Ledesma and his co-defendants were operating a
newsstand in the Parish of St. Bernard, Louisiana, where they of-
fered for sale what the state described as obscene books, magazines,
and playing cards. The newsstand proprietors were charged with
violating a Louisiana statute96 and a St. Bernard Parish Ordinance."
The defendants sought a judgment in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asking that the state
statute be declared unconstitutional. Furthermore, the defendants
sought federal intervention to enjoin further prosecutions under the
statute. Accordingly, a three-judge panel was convened.9" The court
refused to declare the statute unconstitutional, but did rule that the
arrests and the seizure of material were invalid because no prior
hearing had been held to determine whether or not the material was
94. See Porno Report Becomes Political Football, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Oct. 12,
1970, at 34.
95. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
96. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (1971).
97. St. Bernard, La., Parish Ordinance 21-60, Nov. 2, 1960 (repealed March 2,
1971), and replaced by St. Bernard, La., Parish Ordinance 5-71 (March 2, 1971),
adopting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14: 106 (1971).
98. 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1%9), rev'd in part, vacated and remanded in part,
401 U.S. 82 (1971).
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obscene. The court ordered the suppression of the evidence and re-
turn of the material to the defendants.99 The state then appealed the
ruling to the Supreme Court of the United States. Since it was the
Supreme Court's reassessment of its approach to the doctrine of fed-
eral intervention, more than a change in its stand on the substantive
law of obscenity, that is responsible for what well may be a halting
of the Court's libertarian trend, a brief background of the interven-
tion doctrine is essential before further analysis of the case itself.
While the intervention doctrine was not unknown before 1965,
it was in that year that the Supreme Court renewed and strengthened
its application in Dombrowski v. Pfister.100 In Dombrowski, the
defendants asked that a three-judge panel stop the state from pros-
ecuting them for violation of a sedition statute.'' The district court
refused on grounds of abstention, saying that federal courts should
avoid interfering in state prosecutions. The Supreme Court reversed,
citing Ex Parte Young. 102 Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court
in Dombrowski, stated that federal courts could enjoin state pros-
ecutions when unconstitutional state acts were being enforced against
the petitioning parties. 10 3
Use of the intervention doctrine and the three-judge panel has
had at least two results. First, the doctrine was found useful in a
great many legal areas,'0 4 including that of obscenity, where defend-
ants could often find a sanctuary in the three-judge panels to escape
state prosecutions. As a natural consequence, state power was diluted
in this area, and state appellate courts were precluded from making
the initial determination of the constitutionality of their own statutes.
In the eyes of many persons, especially Justice Harlan as may be
seen from his dissenting opinions in most of the more libertarian
obscenity cases, this denial was a violation of the fundamental tenets
of federalism. The second result of the increased use of the inter-
vention doctrine was an extreme crowding of federal court calendars.
This effect was particularly pronounced in the Supreme Court; the
courts of appeals,. which had traditionally acted as buffers in this
99. Id. at 667-70.
100. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S.
479 (1965).
102. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
103. 380 U.S. at 483-89. The vote was 5-2, with Justices Black and Stewart
taking no part. Justices Harlan and Clark dissented.
. 104: The evident purpose behind the Dombrowski decision was to provide a
vehicle for intervention in the civil rights area where southern officials were using
clearly unconstitutional means in harassment efforts. It is important to note that
this' doctrine ,was not. used extensively until the latter half' of the last decade
after many of the major obscenity decisions had been handed down.
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regard, were bypassed as a result of the doctrine which provides for
direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Both results were
onerous in many ways, especially to new Chief Justice Warren
Burger who warned federal judges in January, 1971, that they must
exercise more discretion in convening special three-judge court
panels.'0 5 Justice Black, speaking for the Court in Perez, alerted the
litigants at the outset that the answer to this case was to be found
in a series of other cases decided the same day. Using decisions such
as Younger v. Harris,06 Justice Black wrote that those cases showed
when it is appropriate for a federal court to intervene in the admin-
istration of a state's criminal laws. He added that thanks to such
cases, "the disposition of this case [Perez v. Ledesma] should not
be difficult."'01 7
Justice Black then announced that the doctrine of abstention
should be applied in Perez and similar cases, declaring that, in the
future, federal courts will abstain from premature interference in
state cases. 108 So saying, the Court seemed to heave an almost audible
gasp of relief, retreating from the burdensome task of being the
nation's nine-man board of censors. The new doctrine also signaled
the movement of the Court to new ground, and it seems destined
that this new posture will cast a long shadow on the law of obscenity.
In explaining the position now adopted by the Court, it is necessary
to discuss the Younger case which deserves special attention never-
theless because it involves one of those old talismans of intolerance,
a state criminal syndicalism law.
In that case, John Harris, Jr., had been indicted in a California
court, charged with violation of the state statute which made it a
crime to advocate the use of violence or other unlawful methods to
effect a change in government or in the ownership of industry.'09
Harris contended that prosecution under that statute, a relic of the
distant past, violated his rights of free speech and press. He filed a
complaint in federal district court seeking an injunction against the
prosecution initiated by Los Angeles County District Attorney Evelle
J. Younger. A three-judge federal panel enjoined the prosecution
on the grounds that the syndicalism act was impermissibly vague and
overbroad." °
105. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1971, at 13, col. 6.
106. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
107. 401 U.S. at 82-83.
108. Id. at 83.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1970).
110. Younger v. Harris, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37(1971).
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The state appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court ruling. Writing for the court, Justice Black declared:
Since the beginning of this Country's history, Congress
has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit
state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal
courts.
The precise reasons for this long-standing public policy
against federal court interference with state court proceedings
have never been specifically identified but the primary sources
of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity juris-
prudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly
should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer
irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."'
Justice Black thus held that even if the California Criminal Syndi-
calism statute were unconstitutional on its face, a federal court should
not interrupt a prosecution under that statute in the absence of a
showing that the prosecution involved bad faith or harassment or
that the defendant would suffer irreparable harm.
1 2
So, as Justice Black suggested in the beginning of his opinion
for the Court in Perez v. Ledesma, a majority of the Court had al-
ready made up its mind on abstention doctrine grounds. Justice
Black stated:
There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that Louisi-
ana officials undertook these prosecutions other than in a good-
faith attempt to enforce the State's criminal laws. We there-
fore hold that the three-judge court improperly intruded into
the State's own criminal process and reverse its orders sup-
pressing evidence in the pending state prosecution . .. .11
Then, as if to emphasize this new direction in obscenity cases,
the Supreme Court issued brief per curiam decisions in Dyson v.
Stein1 14 and Byrne v. Karalexis 5
B. Dyson v. Stein
Brent Stein was publisher of an "underground" Dallas, Texas,
bi-weekly newspaper bearing the surprisingly colorless (for under-
111. 401 U.S. at 43, 44.
112. 401 U.S. at 46, 47. See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
113. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 89 (1971).
114. 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
115. 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
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ground papers) name of Dallas Notes. Stein's office was searched
twice by Dallas police, and the gleanings from these incursions re-
sulted in two misdemeanor charges against the publisher. Stein was
charged with possessing obscene "paper" and "pictures" contrary to
the Texas Penal Code."' A three-judge federal court found section
one of the Texas statute to be overbroad, prohibiting legal as well as
illegal conduct." 7 The court ruled that the statute failed to confine
itself "to a context of public or commercial dissemination,""' 8 add-
ing that section one of the Texas statute made mere private posses-
sion of obscene material a crime, contrary to the interpretation of
Stanley relied upon. "[I]n our opinion," said the three-judge court,
Stanley suggests that obscenity is deprived of first amendment pro-
tection only in the context of "public actions taken or intended to
be taken with respect to obscene matter." ' 9 Thus, at the district
court level, Stein moved beyond Stanley v. Georgia's "right to re-
ceive information and ideas," because Stanley's fact situation only
dealt with possessing pornography in the privacy of one's own home,
not one's office. The three-judge court found two sections of the
Texas statute to be unconstitutional and issued injunctions against
the prosecution of Stein.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, toppled the
injunctions, clearing the way for state prosecution of Stein to re-
sume. The Court said that federal intervention affecting pending
state criminal prosecutions, either by injunction or by declaratory
judgment, "is proper only where irreparable injury is threatened."12
Because the district court had made no findings of any "irreparable
injury" to Stein, the case was sent packing back to Texas.
The one dissent in Dyson v. Stein was registered by Mr. Justice
Douglas who found that the prosecution involved police conduct
which amounted to the requisite bad faith and harassment needed to
allow federal court intervention. Justice Douglas described the two
Dallas police searches of the Dallas Notes office as "search-and-
destroy missions in the Vietnamese sense of the phrase."' 21  Mr.
Douglas heatedly contended that the seizure of materials, which in-
cluded photographic enlargers, typewriters, and two tons of the news-
paper, were tactics taken to close down the paper. He added:
116. TEX. PENAL CODE art. 527 (1952).
117. Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), vacated and
remanded sub. nom. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
118. Id. at 607.
119. Id. at 606.
120. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 203 (1971).
121. Id. at 204.
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If this search-and-destroy technique can be employed against
this Dallas newspaper, then it can be done to the New York
Times, the Washington Post, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, the
Yakima Herald-Republic, the Sacramento Bee, and all the rest
of our newspapers....
Government certainly has no power to close down newspapers.
Even censorship - whether for obscenity, for irresponsible re-
porting or editorials, or otherwise - is taboo. 22
Vigorously invoking constitutional prohibitions against pre-publication
censorship or prior restraint,2 3 Justice Douglas expressed his by now
familiar judicial views on the topic of obscenity. However, in the third
obscenity case the Supreme Court decided on February 23, 1971,
Byrne v. Karalexis,124 Justice Douglas had no voice at all. He "took
no part in the consideration or decision" of Byrne because that case in-
volved the film I Am Curious (Yellow), distributed by a firm for
whom Douglas had done a bit of writing - that General Motors
of erotic literature, Grove Press. 2 5
C. Byrne v. Karalexis
At the district court level, a three-judge panel assumed that
I Am Curious (Yellow) was obscene, although it was not made clear
whether it was hard-core or "Brand X" obscenity. On June 3, 1969,
the owners and operators of a Boston theater exhibiting the film were
indicted for showing an obscene film in violation of a Massachusetts
statute.' 26 In response, the owners and operators of the theater sued
in United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to
declare the statute unconstitutional and to enjoin any further state
prosecutions for exhibiting the film.'2 7 The three-judge court, with
one judge dissenting, granted a preliminary injunction forbidding
execution of sentence in the state prosecution then pending, or the
starting of any future prosecutions. 2 By stipulation of counsel, the
122. Id. at 206, 207.
123. Id., citing Near v. Minnesota, 382 U.S. 697 (1931).
124. 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
125. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1970, at 30, col. 5. Grove Press publishes Evergreen
Review, a magazine which printed a long segment from Justice Douglas' book,
Points of Rebellion. Justice Douglas' seemingly innocent act of publishing his work
in a Grove Press publication takes on a different perspective when viewed in the
light that this action will force the outspoken libertarian to refrain from participating
in any case involving the publisher, an active litigant in the area of obscenity. With
Justice Douglas missing, crucials votes could end in a four-four split, upholding
the ruling of a lower court. Even more serious, however, is that Justice Douglas'
keen mind and sharp tongue will be missing in the days ahead when many important
obscenity questions could arise.
126. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 28A (1968).
127. Byrne v. Karalexis, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and
remanded, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
128. Id.
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district court. had accepted that the viewing public had been suf-
ficiently warned - by an X-rating, among other things - of the
possible offensive nature of the film, and that the film had not been
advertised in a "pandering" manner Furthermore, it was also stipu-
lated that no minors had been permitted to enter the theater and view
the film. 129 In. ruling for the theater, Circuit Judge Bailey Aldrich
questioned exactly how far Stanley was intended to go. Was Stanley
to be narrowly limited to "mere private possession of obscene mate-
rial ?" Judge Aldrich wondered whether Stanley was "the high-water
mark of a past flood, or . . . the precursor of a new one.'."" The
judge decided that Stanley cancelled the Roth ruling that obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.
Roth, he added, had denied that a clear and present danger of the
creation of anti-social conduct need be shown in order to sustain a
conviction for obscenity. Stanley, to Judge Aldrich, changed the
aspect of Roth. Judge Aldrich said Stanley meant that
[O]bscenity presented no clear and present danger to the adult
viewer, or to the public as a result of his exposure . . . . Had
the court considered obscenity harmful as such, the fact that
the defendant possessed it privately in his home would have
been of no consequence.
Roth remains intact only with respect to public distribution
in the full sense . . . restricted distribution, adequately con-
trolled, is no longer to be condemned. It is difficult to think
that if Stanley has a constitutional right to view obscene films,
the Court would intend its exercise to be only at the expense
of a criminal act on behalf of the only logical source, the pro-
fessional supplier. A constitutional right to receive a communi-
cation would seem meaningless if there were not a coextensive
right to make it . ...
. . . If a rich Stanley can view a film, or read a book, a poorer
Stanley should' be free to visit a protected theatre or library.
We see no reason for saying he must go alone.13 '
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court by-passed the
logic of: Judge Aldrich's arguments, overturning the injunction and
remanding the case for further prosecution at the state level. The
Court. ruled that because the district court was without the guidance
129. Id. at 1365.
130. Id. at 1366.
131. Id. at 1366-67.
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provided by Younger v. Harris" and Samuels v. Mackell," cases
also decided on that same date of February 23, 1971, the lower
court's judgment should be 'vacated and the case remanded.1 84 Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented from the
per curiam majority opinion, saying that Byrne v. Karalexis should
not have been vacated and remanded. Instead, argued Justice Bren-
nan, the decision of the district court should have been reversed.
The Supreme Court's February 23, 1971, decisions in Perez,
Dyson, and Byrne mean that defendants in obscenity prosecutions
cannot expect helpful intervention from federal courts to short-
circuit state prosecutions. Instead, defendants will be required to
exhaust their remedies in state courts unless they can somehow meet
the difficult burden of proof to show that they are suffering from a
prosecution that is harassing or undertaken in bad faith. The im-
portance of this Supreme Court action is difficult to measure. It is,
however, easy to overemphasize such procedural aspects. After all,
the Court is merely insisting upon a reversion to the status quo prior
to the mid-1960s. Important obscenity cases, which resulted in new
freedom for publishers, found their way into federal courts through
more traditional means." 5 Therefore, revitalization of the doctrine
of abstention should make things little, if any, different than they
were six years ago.
At the same time, however, any impediment to enjoyment of
fundamental freedoms must be looked upon with some disdain and fear.
State courts have traditionally been reluctant to adopt the more
liberal Supreme Court's obscenity standards. The return of absten-
tion is likely to reinforce this behavior and perhaps to give state
judges confidence to be even more conservative than they were in
the past with little fear of a scolding from the federal bench. Crucial
to the ultimate importance of the doctrine of abstention is the out-
come of Miller v. California"' this term, when the Supreme Court
will be asked to squarely decide the issue of whether the community
standards referred to in Roth are national or local standards. If the
answer the Court gives is that local standards must be enforced, and
if defendants have no refuge in the federal courts, then it could
indeed be the beginning of an eclipse of first amendment rights in
this area.
132. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
133. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
134. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 220 (1971).
135. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
136. Unreported, cert. granted, 401 U.S. 992 (1971) (No. 1288).
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V. RE-EMPHASIZING Roth: United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs AND United States v. Reidel
In recent years, some observers perceived that bit-by-bit the
1957 case of Roth v. United States37 was losing its influence over
the law of obscenity. David E. Engdahl, for example, saw Stanley
v. Georgia"88 and subsequent cases as being the beginning of the end:
"the symphony which seems to be emerging is a requiem for Roth.""'9
The requiem was highly premature, because Roth is alive and doing well,
having been explicitly resuscitated by the Supreme Court's May 3, 1971,
decisions in United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs4 . and United
States v. Reidel."4' The cases emphasized in the preceding section
of this article - Perez, Dyson, and Byrne - all gave state prosecu-
tions renewed vigor. In Thirty-Seven Photographs and in Reidel,
Justice White's majority opinions made it clear that federal statutes
against the circulation and distribution of obscenity are still viable.
To do this, Justice White and the colleagues who joined with him
had to cast off some language from Stanley v. Georgia which sug-
gested that under some circumstances, obscenity might be a consti-
tutionally protected expression.' 42
A. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs
In Thirty-Seven Photographs, Milton Luros returned from Eu-
rope on October 24, 1969, carrying the pictures in question in his
luggage. Customs officials seized the photographs as obscene, and on
November 6, 1969, the United States attorney initiated proceedings in
United States district court for forfeiture of the material.' It was
stipulated that some or all of the thirty-seven photographs were to
be published in a hard cover edition of The Kama Sutra, a famed
book of erotica candidly describing a large number of sexual positions.
Luros denied that the photographs were obscene, and demanded that
a three-judge court be convened to issue an injunction against the
enforcement of the United States statute prohibiting the importation
of obscene material.' 44 The three-judge court declared the statute
to be unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement of it against the
137. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
138. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
139. Engdahl, supra note 6, at 185.
140. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
141. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
142. See p. 227 supra.
143. 402 U.S. at 366.
144. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970). See note 70 supra.
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thirty-seven photographs, which were ordered returned to Luros. 14
The court invalidated the statute on two grounds; first, that the sec-
tion did not meet procedural requirements, and second, that under
Stanley v. Georgia the statute could not be validly applied to the
seized photographs. 4
6
On appeal to the Supreme Court, five Justices joined Justice
White on the point of procedural requirements in following the tradi-
tional judicial maxim that an attempt should be made to construe
statutes in such a fashion as to make them constitutional. The Court
then declared that it was possible to interpret the law in a manner
which would "bring it in harmony with constitutional require-
ments."' 47 Administrative censorship, by motion picture screening
boards or by an agency such as the Post Office department, meets
constitutional standards if "a judicial determination occurs promptly
so that administrative delay does not in itself become a form of cen-
sorship.' 4  Justice White was joined in the majority opinion by
Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Brennan, with Justices Harlan and
Stewart concurring as to the constitutionality of procedures under
19 U.S.C. section 1305 (a) ; the decision thus signified no change in
the law so far as procedural requirements were concerned.
Justice White then turned to Luros's second claim of unconsti-
tutionality, based on Stanley v. Georgia. He wrote:
On the authority of Stanley, Luros urged the trial court to con-
strue the First Amendment as forbidding any restraints on ob-
cenity except where necessary to protect children or where it
intruded itself upon the sensitivity or privacy of an unwilling
adult. Without rejecting this position, the trial court read
Stanley as protecting, at the very least, the right to read obscene
material in the privacy of one's own home and to receive it for
that purpose. It therefore held that §1305(a), which bars the
importation of obscenity for private use as well as for com-
mercial distribution, is overbroad and hence unconstitutional. 49
Justice White, rejected the trial court's finding, saying that Stanley
should not have been read as immunizing from seizure at a port of
entry obscene materials intended solely for private use. He added
that Stanley's declaration that a private user may not be prosecuted
for possession of obscenity in his home does not mean that he is
145. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal.
1970), rev'd and remanded, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
146. Id. at 37-38.
147. 402 U.S. at 368.
148. Id. at 367. See also Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) ; Teitel Film
Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) ; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
149. 402 U.S. at 375.
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"entitled to import obscenity from abroad free from the power of
Congress to exclude noxious articles from commerce." 5 '
Stanley's emphasis was on: the freedom of thought and mind in
the privacy of the home. But a port of entry is not a traveler's
home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of
his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials
when his possession of them is discovered during such a
search. . . .Whatever the scope of the right to receive obscenity
adumbrated in Stanley, that right, as we said in Reidel, does
not extend to one who is seeking, as was Luros here, to dis-
tribute obscene materials to the public, nor does it extend to one
seeking to import obscene materials from abroad, whether for
private use or public distribution.'51
The italicized phrase in the preceding quotation brought forth
concurring opinions from both Justices Harlan and Stewart. Mr.
Harlan noted that Luros had admitted that he was importing the
photographs for commercial purposes, and asked whether Luros
should be allowed to raise the question of constitutional privilege
to import for private use. He added: "I would hold that Luros
lacked standing to raise the overbreadth claim."'1
52
Justice Stewart agreed with Justice White's opinion that the
first amendment does not prevent the seizure, at the nation's borders,
of obscene materials imported for commercial dissemination. How-
ever, he cautioned:
I would not in this case decide, even by way of dicta, that the
Government may lawfully seize literary material intended for
the purely private us of the importer. The terms of the statute
appear to apply to an American tourist who, after exercising
his constitutionally protected liberty to travel abroad, returns
home with a single book in his luggage, with no intention of
selling it or otherwise using it, except to read it. If the Govern-
ment can constitutionally take the book away from him as he
passes through customs, then I do not understand the meaning
of Stanley v. Georgia . ..."'
B. United States v. Reidel
Thirty-Seven Photographs, however, was not nearly so explicit
about the rejection of libertarian readings of Stanley v. Georgia as
was United States v. Reidel."' Norman Reidel was indicted on April
150. Id. at 376.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 378 (Harlan, J., concurring).
153. Id. at.379 (Stewart, J., concurring). See Note, First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 910 (1970).
154. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
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15, 1970, on three counts of having violated the federal statute
against mailing obscenity. 5 Each count represented the mailing of a
single copy of The True Facts About Imported Pornography, and one of
these copies had been mailed to a postal inspector (who was over
the age of 21) who had responded to a newspaper advertisement.
Reidel asked in district court that the indictment against him be dis-
missed, urging that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial judge,
assuming for purposes of the mailing that the book was obscene,
granted Reidel's motion to dismiss on the ground that Reidel had
made a constitutionally protected delivery, and therefore the statute
section involved was unconstitutional as applied to him.'56
Justice White, speaking for the majority of the Court, returned
to the Roth approach of handling obscenity. The Court reaffirmed
the holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press . . . . "' Justice White added that Roth
has not been overruled and remains as the law governing Reidel's
case, for Reidel, like Roth, had been charged with use of the mails
to distribute obscene material. It then remained for Justice White
to attempt to distill clarity out of the confusion in the majority
opinion in Stanley.
Stanley v. Georgia ... compels no different result [in the Reidel
case]. There, pornographic films were found in Stanley's home
and he was convicted under Georgia statutes for possessing ob-
scene material. This Court reversed the conviction, holding that
the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitu-
tionally be made a crime. But it neither overruled nor disturbed
the holding in Roth. Indeed, in the Court's view, the constitu-
tionality of proscribing private possession of obscenity was a
matter of first impression in this Court, a question neither in-
volved nor decided in Roth."'
The majority opinion further declared that nothing in Stanley ques-
tioned the validity of Roth so far as distribution of obscene material
was concerned. Justice White, finding clarity where others found
confusion, wrote: "Clearly the Court had no thought of questioning
the validity of section 1461 as applied to those who, like Reidel, are
routinely disseminating obscenity through the mails ....,, Justice
White declared that Reidel could make no claim similar to that in
Stanley about governmental intrusion into the privacy of his home.
He added:
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). See note 10 supra.
156. 402 U.S. at 355.
157. Id. at 354, quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
158. 402 U.S. at 354.
159. Id. at 354-55.
[VOL. 17: p. 211
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss2/1
DECEMBER 1971]
The District Court ignored both Roth and the express
limitations on the reach of the Stanley decision. Relying on the
statement in Stanley that "the Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas . . . regardless of their social
worth." 394 U.S., at 564, 89 S. Ct. at 1247, the trial judge
reasoned that "if a person has the right to receive and possess
this material, then someone must have the right to deliver it to
him." He concluded that § 1461 could not be validly applied
"where obscene material is not directed at an unwilling public,
where the material such as in this case is solicited by adults ......
Whatever the scope of the "right to receive" referred to in
Stanley, it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings in ob-
scenity in which Reidel engaged here - dealings which Roth
held unprotected by the First Amendment.16 °
Four other Justices joined in the opinion of the Court in Reidel.
Two others - Justices Harlan and Marshall - agreed firmly that
the right to privately possess obscene materials did not carry with it
a "right to receive" such materials.'
Only two - Justice Black and Justice Douglas - were willing
to complain about Justice White's reading of Stanley and about the
consequent return to Roth. Justice Black's dissent declared:
I particularly regret to see the Court revive the doctrine
of Roth v. United States that "obscenity" is speech for some
reason unprotected by the First Amendment. As the Court's
many decisions in this area demonstrate, it is extremely diffi-
cult for judges or any other citizens to agree on what is "ob-
scene." Since the distinctions between protected speech and
"obscenity" are so elusive and obscure almost every "obscenity"
case involves difficult constitutional issues. After Roth our
docket and those of other courts have constantly been crowded
with cases where judges are called upon to decide whether a
particular book, magazine, or movie may be banned. I have
expressed before my view that I can imagine no task for which
this Court of lifetime judges is less equipped to deal.' 62
Clearly in Reidel and Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Supreme
Court attempted to tidy up some of the judicial debris left behind by
the Stanley and Redrup decisions. One way of explaining the Court's
shift of direction is on the basis of a philosophical change of heart,
a realization that it had gone too far and must now begin to moderate
its position. Another possible explanation for these decisions is that
160. Id. at 355.
161. Id. at 358-59 (Harlan, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 379-80 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the members of the Supreme Court, with the exception of Justices
Black and Douglas who have spoken in absolutes, are nearly as confused
as everyone else about the problem and have fumbled uncertainly for ajudicial pathway out of the swamp of obscenity law. In any event,
the Court's decisions in Reidel and Thirty-Seven Photographs em-
phasized that Roth v. United States is back in business, and that the
substantive law of obscenity has changed very little since the late
1960s.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In a recent cartoon, one judge faced another, and said (with a
pontifical expression) : "I know it's obscenity if it makes my Adam's
apple bobble." With the law of obscenity, minds boggle as Adam's
apples bobble, and yesterday's confusion forever seems to turn out
to be today's chaos.
As recently as January of 1971, there did seem to be hope that
the Supreme Court of the United States would bring a bit more order
to that troubled area of law and there were even glimmers that the
Court was headed on a new, liberal course. Indeed, it seemed that
the Court's wish to retreat from writing such frequent obscenity de-
cisions could be seen in lines of cases drawing upon Redrup v. New
York. 6 and Stanley v. Georgia."' As discussed in Section II of
this article, the Court suggested in Redrup and Stanley that in the
absence of antisocial conduct such as selling sexy reading materials
to juveniles or advertising in a pandering or privacy-invading man-
ner, obscenity prosecutions could not succeed. Such interpretations
of Redrup and Stanley, however, are now out of the question thanks
to the Supreme Court's decisions of the spring of 1971.
It is now evident that Redrup and Stanley did far less to change
the law of obscenity than most people believed shortly after those
decisions were handed down. If we conceive of Redrup and Stanley
in the same vein as Roth, a major change in direction for the Court,
then we can conceive of Ledesma, Byrne, Stein, Reidel and Thirty-
Seven Photographs in the same vein as Manual Enterprises, Freed-
man, Fanny Hill, and Jacobellis. The second waves of cases in both
instances were attempts to clarify the major policy pronouncements
of the first wave.
Redrup and Stanley, however, needed even more clarification
than did Roth. Redrup, for example, suggested that there are two
kinds of obscenity, but only defined one: hard-core pornography.
163. 388 U.S. 767 (1967).
164. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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Redrup appears to have envisioned a kind of Utopian society in which
people who deal in obscenity would nicely follow the rules laid down
in the decision. Such a society, of course, does not and doubtless will
not ever exist. There will always be those persons who attempt to
place themselves at the fringes of the law and who will continue to
create judicial headaches, problems insoluble by a short set of judically
prescribed guidelines.
The confusion of Redrup was carried over to Stanley. Justice
Marshall and the majority of the Court apparently did not consider
problems which would arise by granting to man the right to read what-
ever he pleases in his own home. How would this material get into the
home if it were not purchased? And if there were a purchaser, then
obviously there must be a seller and a publisher. Their activities, to
continue the line of such reasoning, must also be condoned. That a
number of lower courts made such an extrapolation from Stanley was
natural. Many scholars did so as well. An additional lack of precision
has been generated by unanswered questions lurking within Stanley.
For example, what kind of obscenity is insulated by the first amend-
ment?
Justice White's opinions in Reidel and Thirty-Seven Photographs
suggest that while some new standards were set, any thought of a bold,
new liberal approach to the problems of judicial evaluation of obscenity
is a pipedream at this time. Certainly we could read more into the
two opinions in Reidel and Thirty-Seven Photographs than really
exists - this is always a danger. Justice White, however, was far
less ambiguous than was Marshall in Stanley, for example, indicating
perhaps that at least some members of the Court had not meant
Stanley to abandon the Roth standards. At any rate, it seems quite
certain that Roth is still the standard which will guide the law.
Roth implies that there is such a thing as obscenity which can
be defined and constitutionally proscribed. This definition is, of
course, a legal fiction which would have us believe that obscenity is,
as Justice Harlan wrote with some pique, "a particular genus of
speech and press, which is as distinct, recognizable and classifiable
as poison ivy is among plants."' 65 It is ironic that none of the re-
cent cases have added significantly to the attempt to define obscenity
found in Roth and its progeny. Little has been gained in this area
in the past five to six years.
The single case which did work toward defining obscenity was
Redrup, suggesting that there are two kinds of obscenity, one called
165. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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hard-core pornography which lacks any redeeming social value, and
"Brand X". "Brand X" is as yet undescribed, but it is somehow not
quite so bad as hard-core, and can be proscribed only if the conduct of
the seller or the distributor falls to certain levels. 6 ' It is hoped that if
the Supreme Court makes no other strides in the law of obscenity
during its current term, it will try to add clarification to the puzzling
"two kinds of obscenity" aspect of Redrup.
The Court's diminution of the power of lower federal courts
to intervene in state proceedings (cf. Perez, Dyson, and Byrne) will
have a serious impact upon defendants in obscenity cases, but will
probably have little impact upon the law. The rejuvenation of the
doctrine of abstention will not change the substantive law of ob-
scenity, but booksellers, publishers, theater owners and the like must
prepare themselves for greater legal problems as state power in this
area once again becomes significant. In addition, if the Supreme
Court should decide in Miller v. California167 that local rather than
national community standards are the yardstick for measuring ob-
scenity, then the number of successful prosecutions should increase
dramatically. If the Supreme Court is interested in getting out of
the business of hearing obscenity cases, a ruling that local standards
are the measure would facilitate such an escape. In other respects,
however, the insistence upon use of the doctrine of abstention is
merely a move back to the standards of the Sixties.
The Court also seems to be seeking outside guidance for its
future course. An indication of its frustration and confusion as well
can be seen plainly in the comments of Justice White concerning the
trends in the law:
It is urged that there is developing sentiment that adults
should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess, and
consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them
and that the law's involvement with obscenity should be limited
to those situations where children are involved or where it is
necessary to prevent imposition on unwilling recipients of what-
ever age.168
Justice White noted that the concepts involved in the law of obscenity
are elusive, and that the statutes involved are "inherently unenforce-
able without extravagant expenditures of time and effort by enforce-
ment officers and courts .. ."'19 He urged that a basic reassess-
ment of the area is essential, and then declared that the task of re-
166. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967).
167. Unreported, cert. granted, 401 U.S. 992 (1971) (No. 1288).
168. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971).
169. Id.
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structuring obscenity laws belongs to "those who pass, repeal, and
amend such ordinances.'1 70
While this plea for legislative restructuring of the law of ob-
scenity was doubtless heartfelt, the authors of this article fear that
few if any legislatures will follow Justice White's lead, at least in the
foreseeable future. Legislators are subject to re-election, and a repre-
sentative's vote to repeal or liberalize obscenity statutes would prob-
ably result in that person being voted out of office at the next elec-
tion. One can almost hear the campaign slogan: "Congressman
X voted for smut."
While waiting vainly for legislative guidance, confused scholars
must comfort themselves with the knowledge that many lower courts
are also baffled by what the Supreme Court is doing or trying to do
in defining pornography. Students of obscenity law learned long ago
that logic and reason are not hallmarks of this area of American
jurisprudence. That we are more confused than ever today is per-
haps a sign of the times. The door into Alice's mad Wonderland is
clearly open. The question is, does it lie in our path ...or have we
already, unwittingly, crossed the threshold?
170. Id. (emphasis added).
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